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(MIS)RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY
MARRIAGES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN AND SOUTH
AFRICAN FAMILY LAW
Corbin William Golding* **
This paper explores the methods of recognizing customary
marriages conducted between Indigenous participants
within Canada and South Africa, respectively. It primarily
focuses on the functional and philosophical consequences
of these methods on the validity of the customary
marriages. This paper begins by establishing the problem
of misrecognition, which is an injustice that devalues and
dehumanizes marital relationships that differ from the
European norm. It then turns to an analysis of the forms of
recognition in both Canada and South Africa. The former
is examined through an investigation of historical case law
and more recent constitutional issues, while the latter
analysis focuses on statutory requirements and their
interpretation by the courts. Each of the sections are
followed by a substantive and functional critique of each
country’s system. The final section introduces a theoretical
proposal for recognizing customary marriages in Canada
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in a way that would best achieve justice for their
Indigenous participants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For at least eight thousand years, the island of Yalis—now
known as Alert Bay off the northern shore of Vancouver
Island1—has been inhabited by the Kwakwaka’wakw
people, a sea-faring culture that was traditionally
comprised of twenty-eight different patrilineal
communities.2 Historically, the Kwakwaka’wakw society
was divided into hierarchical kinship groups called
“numayms,” each of which traced its genealogy back to a
founding animal ancestor-spirit which had taken human
form, and gave spiritual gifts and social rank to their
descendants.3 Such beliefs gave family and kinship a
central place within the Kwakwaka’wakw culture since
nobility, ceremonial privileges, and social position could
all be gained or transferred through marriage and
inheritance.4 More importantly, stability within the family
structure was of cosmological importance: an improper or
invalid marriage could sever the connection to the
ancestor-spirit and not only leave the individual family

1

See Village of Alert Bay, “About Alert Bay” (last visited 10 July 2022),
online: Village of Alert Bay <www.alertbay.ca/about-alert-bay>.

2

See Gloria Cranmer Webster, “Kwakwaka’wakw (Kwakiutl)” (last
modified 3 August 2018), online: The Canadian Encyclopedia
<www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/kwakiutl>.

3

Joseph Masco, “‘It is Strict Law That Bids Us Dance’: Cosmologies,
Colonialism, Death, and Ritual Authority in the Kwakwak’wakw
Potlach, 1849 to 1922” (1995) 37:1 Comp Stud in Society & History
41 at 47.

4

Ibid at 46–48.
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without its protection, but expose the entire society to “the
destructive forces in the universe.”5
Such destructive forces were nearly unleashed a
century ago, when Tom Williams was tried for the murder
of Ernest Jack at Alert Bay on Cormorant Island.6 Jack’s
remains were discovered by police in 1921 and, following
an investigation, Williams was arrested and committed for
trial.7 The prosecution sought to call a woman named
Jennie Williams as a witness, but the admissibility of
Jennie’s evidence was objected to by the defense on the
grounds that Tom and Jennie had been married according
to their Kwakwaka’wakw custom.8 A voir dire was held to
determine the admissibility of her testimony since, if she
were indeed his wife, she would not be a compellable
witness.9 Whether the Williamses had married one another
in adherence to their own customs was uncontroversial.
What Justice Gregory had to decide was whether Jennie
5

Ibid at 47; and see the discussion on kinships generally in ibid at 47–
49.

6

Rex v Tom Williams, 37 CCC 126, 1921 CanLII 623 (BCSC) [Williams
cited to CCC].

7

Ibid at 127.

8

Ibid. The actual cultural group of the Williamses is never mentioned in
the case. Their membership in the Kwakwaka’wakw culture is
speculative, but is the most likely case given that this is the dominant
culture on both Alert Bay and Kingcome Inlet, where they were
married. See Donald J Auger, The Northern Ojibwe and Their Family
Law (Doctor of Jurisprudence Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, 2001) [unpublished] at 20. See also Dzawada’enuxw First
Nation, “Dzawada’enuxw of Kingcome Inlet” (last visited 10 July
2022), online: Kingcome <www.kingcome.ca/people>.

9

See e.g. Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 4(3).
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could properly be considered Tom’s spouse under
Canadian law, since they had not been married “according
to Provincial laws.”10 After hearing evidence from the local
Indian agent concerning Indigenous customs, and also
from one Mrs. Cook, “an Indian…who was born and raised
at Alert Bay,” Gregory J. decided, without providing his
reasons, that Jennie’s testimony was not admissible.11
R v Williams is one of the small number of cases in
Canadian jurisprudence where marriages conducted
according to Indigenous law were tacitly acknowledged to
decide a distinct issue. In each case, the court held the
awesome power to unilaterally nullify the rights and
obligations that spouses owe to one another and to their
communities—not to mention to their spiritual and
cosmological order—simply because the marriage was not
in a form recognized by the state. Tom and Jennie were
among the lucky ones, primarily because relationships such
as theirs had been begrudgingly accepted by their regional
Department of Indian Affairs.12 Others have been less
fortunate, and have been told by the court that their
relationships, whatever status they may have held within
their own cultures, were not marriages under Canadian law,
resulting in intestacy, illegitimacy, or charges of
contempt.13
10

Williams, supra note 6 at 127.

11

Ibid at 128.

12

Ibid.

13

See e.g. Ex Parte Cote (1971), 22 DLR (3d) 353, 1971 CanLII 782
(SKCA) [Ex Parte Cote cited to CanLII]; Manychief v Poffenroth,
[1995] 2 CNLR 67, 1994 CanLII 9130 (ABQB) [Manychief cited to
CanLII].
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Bradford W. Morse correctly points out that “[o]ne
of the most immediately striking factors in the response of
the Canadian judiciary to the traditional family law of the
native people of Canada is its general refusal to define it as
‘law’ in the first place.”14 At best, such marriages are
recognized as creating a valid legal relationship, but are
branded with the label “customary,” implying that they are
grounded within tradition rather than law and that they are
“somehow less important and less durable” than civil
marriages.15 At worst, they are ignored or even
criminalized.16 In all cases, Canadian Indigenous-law
marriages are recognized only so far as they are able to
adhere to the European standard, and are only thought to
grant the rights, privileges, and obligations that civil
marriages allow. In short, “customary marriages” are
recognized as being functionally, substantively, and
axiologically equivalent to civil marriages, while anything
which does not fit within this mould is tossed aside as being
superfluous or even socially dangerous.
Yet Canada is not alone in its strange
misrecognition of such relationships. While other settler
states have taken a similar, ad hoc stance toward their

14

Bradford W Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family law and the Canadian
Legal System” (1980) 8:2 Am Indian L Rev 199 at 219 [Morse, “Indian
and Inuit Family Law”].

15

Ibid. This essay will primarily use the term “Indigenous-law
marriages” when referring to such relationships, though “customary
marriage” is still used occasionally when referring to South Africa’s
statutory system, or when quoting other authors.

16

See e.g. The Queen v “Bear’s Shin Bone.” (1899), 3 CCC 329, 1899
CanLII 111 (NWTSC) [Bear’s Shin Bone cited to CCC].
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quasi-acknowledgment,17 South Africa has codified their
validity and operation within its Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act, 1998.18 However, even this system has
proven to be far from perfect in either its function or
philosophy. In many ways it simply perpetuates the prior
colonial notion that Indigenous traditional laws are only
valid as far as they align with European common law or
legislated norms. Rather than empowering living, evolving
South African Indigenous legal structures in their own
right, the RCMA forces compliance with a statutory system
that also equates customary marriages with civil marriages
while discarding almost everything that makes the
customary marriages ideologically distinct.
The misrecognition of Indigenous-law marriages
through simple equation with civil marriages leads to
serious harm and genuine social consequences. As Leon
Sheleff puts it:
The manner in which customary law is
perceived is of vital importance…. A
perception of custom as some formalized
relic of backward people, will lead to certain
inescapable consequences, that customs can
only be recognized if they are of longstanding

17

See e.g. the discussion in Richard Chisholm, “Aboriginal Law in
Australia: The Law Reform Commission's Proposals for Recognition”
(1988) 10:1 U Haw L Rev 47.

18

(S Afr), No 120 of 1998 [RCMA].

74

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 34, 2022]

usage, and once recognized, cannot be
changed.19
Indeed, as Nancy Fraser argues in the context of
non-heterosexual
relationships,
“misrecognition
20
constitutes a fundamental injustice” since it impedes a
parity of participation in the legal rights enjoyed by other
married couples in the dominant society. Moreover, it
prevents the exercise of legal rights and privileges that
were historically enjoyed by sovereign Indigenous peoples
for thousands of years before colonization. “Far from
occupying some wispy, ethereal realm,”21 the
consequences of misrecognition “are material in their
existence and effects.”22
As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in
Halpern v Canada (Attorney General), “[t]he societal
significance of marriage, and the corresponding benefits
that are available only to married persons, cannot be
overlooked.”23 Marriage is “one of the most significant

19

Leon Sheleff, The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law
and Legal Pluralism (London: Routledge, 1999) at 84.

20

Nancy Fraser, “Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A
Response to Judith Butler” (1997) 52/53 Social Text 279 at 281–82.
While Fraser’s article discusses misrecognition in the context of
LGBTQ individuals, Fraser explicitly recognizes that her argument
also applies to racial or cultural misrecognition.

21

Ibid at 282.

22

Ibid.

23

(2003), 225 DLR (4th) 529 at para 107, 2003 CanLII 26403 (ON CA)
[Halpern].
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forms of personal relationships,”24 yet Indigenous
Canadians are functionally excluded from their own legal
forms of marriage except insofar as they align with
European norms. This perpetuates the view that they are
not truly spouses until state says they are, and even then
often only to a limited extent.
This essay aims to explore three options for the
recognition of Indigenous-law marriages by examining two
existing methods within the legal structures of Canada and
South Africa, and a third theoretical proposal. Part II of this
essay will focus on the Canadian method of recognition
called “Admittance as Fact.” It first explores the
recognition of Indigenous marriages conducted according
to Indigenous customs within historical case law to
determine the status of such marriages prior to 1982, before
moving into a discussion of their current Canadian
constitutional classification as Aboriginal rights. Part III
then turns to the system in South Africa called
“Codification.” It will inspect the most relevant provisions
of the RCMA relating to the statutory requirements to
establish a valid customary marriage in South Africa, and
survey how these provisions have been interpreted by the
courts. Each Part will conclude with a critique of the
respective method of recognition from a functional and
substantive perspective. Finally, Part IV will argue that
neither of these methods appropriately recognize the
inherent value of marriage, but instead perpetuate a form
of political violence that devalues and dehumanizes
Indigenous cultures. A third method of recognition will be
proposed, called “Side-by-Side Existence,” which

24

Ibid at para 5.
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recommends that Canada acknowledge a system of selfregulation and internal dispute resolution.
A brief word must be said at the outset about what
this essay does not attempt to do. It is not an attempt to
exhaustively lay out the entirety of Canadian or South
African Indigenous family law, nor does it explore every
effect of marriage within their legal systems. Instead, this
essay is narrowly focused on comparing how these two
countries recognize the validity and status of Indigenouslaw marriages as compared to civil marriages. As such, the
proprietary, progenitive, or patrimonial consequences of
marriage will only be considered insofar as they arise in
such discussions of validity or status—for example, how
marriage registration systems that are necessary for
validity impact the property of unregistered polygamous
spouses.25

25

As a note on terminology, “polygamous” (meaning “multiple
spouses”) will be the preferred term of this essay, as opposed to
“polygynous” (meaning “multiple wives”) or “polyandrous” (meaning
“multiple husbands”). While the vast majority of Indigenous cultures
in Canada and South Africa that have plural marriages are polygynous,
some Inuit and South African cultures are, in fact, polyandrous (see
Auger, supra note 8 at 168; Johan D van der Vyver, “Multi-Tiered
Marriages in South Africa” in Joel E Nichols, ed, Marriage and
Divorce in a Multicultural Context: Multi-Tiered Marriages and the
Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012) 200 at 208). Excluding them through narrow
terminology would be arbitrary and unfair.
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II. CANADA – ADMITTANCE AS FACT
A. RECOGNITION IN CASE LAW
Prior to the affirmation of Aboriginal rights in the
Constitution Act, 1982,26 Indigenous-law marriages drew
their validity within Canadian law from their recognition
by courts. Yet in all cases where such marriages were
considered by the judiciary, the validity or invalidity of the
marriage was only secondary to the principal issue before
the court. In fact, in most cases, the validity of the marriage
was not seen as a matter of Canadian law at all, but rather
an issue of foreign law and its interaction with Canadian
civil, statutory, or common law requirements; that is, these
cases presented a problem to be decided by the rules
surrounding the international conflict of laws. Morse
argues that “[t]he clear weight of these decisions supports
the validity of Indian and Inuit customary law concerning
marriage, divorce, and adoption, as well as their impact
upon inheritance, spousal immunity in evidence, and
related matters.”27 As we will see, this statement is only
partially correct, and obscures the fact that the recognition
of operational validity within Canadian law is not identical
to the recognition of independent substantive validity.
The bulk of Canadian decisions can usefully be
divided into three categories: estate cases, where the
26

Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11, s 35(1) [CA, 1982].

27

Bradford W Morse, “Indigenous Law and State Legal Systems:
Conflict and Compatibility” in Bradford W Morse & Gordon R
Woodman, eds, Indigenous Law and the State (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Foris Publications, 1988) 101 at 108.
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primary issue was determining the legitimacy of one or
more heirs; wives’ evidence cases, where the primary issue
was whether a spouse was a compellable witness; and
polygamy cases, where the primary issue was whether the
accused was married to more than one spouse at the same
time.28 We will examine each of these categories in turn,
and attempt to identify the nuances in argumentation that
were used to restrict the recognition of Indigenous-law
marriages to solve the precise issue at hand.
1. Estate Cases
The first case that we know of to grapple with the validity
of an Indigenous-law marriage in Canada was
Tranchemontagne v Monteferrand,29 an unreported
decision out of the Superior Court of Lower Canada in
1854. Hugh Faris had married a Métis woman named
Josephte Mainville, presumably within Métis territory
since the Court refers to their marriage as being “according
to the custom of the country,” though this is never made
explicit.30 There appears to have been no formal ceremony,
“but simply cohabitation and reputation.”31 A daughter,
Louise Faris, was born of the marriage, who in turn married

28

See Auger, supra note 8 at 11, where he identifies these same
categories. The author is in Auger’s debt for this simple but helpful
division.

29

(27 October 1854), Montreal No 286 (Sup Ct LC) [Tranchemontagne],
quoted in full in Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 1 CNLC 70, [1867] QJ
No 1 (QL) at paras 145–47 (Que Sup Ct) [Connolly cited to QL],
online: <peel.library.ualberta.ca/bibliography/476/4.html>.

30

Ibid at para 145.

31

Ibid.
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M. Montferrand.32 After Hugh’s death, his lands were
seized and due to be inherited by Louise, but this was
opposed by Hugh’s nephew, Charles Faris, on the grounds
that Louise was illegitimate and that Charles was the
rightful heir.33 As Morse points out, Louise’s “claim to the
realty depended solely…upon the validity of the
marriage.”34 The three-member panel of judges ruled in
favour of Louise without providing any reasons for their
decision.35
Nevertheless, a decidedly more fulsome opinion
was provided in the next case to deal with the issue, which
is generally regarded as the locus classicus in this area:
Connolly v Woolrich.36 William Connolly—a French
Canadian from Lachine, Québec—travelled with the fur
trade, and while working near the Rivière aux Rats in the
Athabaska territory of what is now northern Alberta,37 he

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

34

Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family Law”, supra note 14 at 222.

35

Connolly, supra note 29 at para 147.

36

Supra note 29. See also Mark D Walters, “The Judicial Recognition of
Indigenous Legal Traditions: Connolly v Woolrich at 150” (2017) 22:3
Rev Const Stud 347 at 349; Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family Law,”
supra note 14 at 222; Norman K Zlotkin, “Judicial Recognition of
Aboriginal Customary Law in Canada: Selected Marriage and
Adoption Cases,” [1984] 4 CNLR 1 at 1 [Zlotkin, “Judicial
Recognition”].

37

This is according to Justice Monk in Connolly, supra note 29 at para 9.
Modern historians now place Connolly’s trading post in northern
Manitoba: see Walters, supra note 36 at 350.
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married the daughter of a Cree chief in 1803.38 His wife is
referred to throughout the decision as Susanne Pas-denom,39 meaning Susanne No-Name, though Susanne did of
course have a name which was neither Pas-de-nom nor
Susanne. Her Cree name was Miyo Nipay, meaning
“Beautiful Leaf.”40 William “continually acknowledged
and treated [Miyo Nipay] as his wife” for twenty-eight
years, having several children with her.41 One of their
daughters, Amelia, was later married to Sir James Douglas,
the eventual governor of British Columbia.42
However, upon their return to Québec, William
abandoned Miyo Nipay and married instead his second
cousin, Julia Woolrich, with whom he had two more
children.43 William died in 1849 and left his entire estate to
Julia and his children by her. But one of his sons by Miyo
Nipay, John Connolly, sued on the basis that William had
died while married to his mother, the second marriage
being a nullity. If this was the case, then half of William’s
estate automatically should have gone to Miyo Nipay under
Lower Canada’s community of property regime.44

38

Connolly, supra note 29 at paras 2, 8.

39

Ibid.

40

Walters, supra note 36 at 366. See also Sylvia Van Kirk, “Tracing the
Fortunes of Five Founding Families of Victoria” (1997/8) 115/116 BC
Studies 149 at 152.

41

Connolly, supra note 29 at para 8.

42

Walters, supra note 36 at 352.

43

Connolly, supra note 29 at paras 9–10.

44

Walters, supra note 36 at 352.
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Since British law had not yet extended to the
territory in which the marriage took place by 1803, and
since William Connolly had apparently acceded to Cree
law in the solemnization of the marriage,45 Justice Monk of
the Québec Superior Court did not attempt to determine
whether the legalities of a Cree marriage should be
recognized on their own terms under Canadian law. Rather,
he treated the issue as one of a foreign marriage—à la
façon du pays—and its application to the family law of
Lower Canada. This required two distinct inquiries: first,
whether the marriage was indeed valid under Cree law as
it existed at the time; and second, whether the marriage
exhibited enough requisite characteristics of a civil
marriage that it could be recognized by European law.46
In the first matter, Monk J. examined an extensive
array of historical and testimonial evidence before
concluding that a law of marriage did exist among the
“barbarians,” and commending them for “approach[ing] so
near to the holy inculcations of Christianity” through the
aid of natural theology—a doctrine holding that the
Christian God had made certain general moral rules
discoverable through nature alone.47 Further, William and
Miyo Nipay were indeed married according to this Cree
law, as demonstrated by their continual cohabitation and
his “repeated and solemn declarations that he had married
his Indian wife according to the usages and customs of her
45

Connolly, supra note 29 at para 8.

46

Zlotkin, “Judicial Recognition”, supra note 36 at 2.

47

Connolly, supra note 29 at para 93. See also Andrew Chignell & Derk
Pereboom, “Natural Theology and Natural Religion” in N Zalta, ed,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 ed, online:
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-theology>.
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tribe or nation.”48 As such, Monk J. held that William and
Miyo Nipay were married under the lex loci celebrationis.
Turning to whether that marriage should be
recognized by the lex fori, however, Monk J. disregarded
any aspects of Cree marriage laws that did not resemble
European customs, including the fact that William had
apparently repudiated Miyo Nipay in a manner that would
have been sufficient to constitute a divorce under Cree
law.49 As Norman Zlotkin explains it, Monk J. held that a
“foreign marriage”—such as a marriage solemnized in
Cree territory—“would be recognized…if the marriage had
certain basic characteristics: if it was voluntary; it must
have been intended by the parties to last for life; and it must
not have been polygamous.”50 That is, it would be valid in
Québec if it fit the common law definition of marriage, as
best enunciated in Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee:51 “the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others.”52 Since the marriage of William
and Miyo Nipay met these characteristics, it was sufficient
to constitute a valid marriage in Québec; however, the
repudiation was insufficient to constitute a divorce, since
William had to comply with Québec’s divorce
requirements once back in that province. Thus, William’s
marriage with Julia Connolly was a nullity.53
48

Conolly, supra note 29 at para 94.

49

Ibid at para 158.

50

Zlotkin, “Judicial Recognition”, supra note 36 at 2.

51

Hyde v Hyde (1866), LR 1 P&D at 130.

52

Ibid.

53

Connolly, supra note 29 at para 168.
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The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal of
Québec,54 which dismissed it. A subsequent appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was abandoned
after an out-of-court settlement was reached, likely due to
the influence and embarrassment of Amelia Douglas and
her politically powerful husband.55 This left Monk J.’s
opinion as the definitive statement on the issue and the one
which was largely adhered to by Canadian courts until at
least 1982. This also created the unfortunate precedent that
Indigenous-law marriages were to be recognized, as Mark
Walters puts it, “because [they] approximated the Christian
ideal of marriage”56 and because they satisfied the requisite
elements of a civil marriage, but not because they held any
independent force of law.
The reasoning in Connolly was applied virtually
unchanged in the next estate case, Robb v Robb et al.57
William Robb married Supul-Catle, the daughter of a
Comox chief, according to Comox law, which required the
payment of a bride-price and the giving of presents to her
family.58 After his death, their daughter Sarah became
involved in a dispute with William’s mother over the
validity of the marriage, and hence Sarah’s legitimacy.
Following the reasoning in Connolly, and quoting that case
directly, the Court held that “when a doubt exists as to the
legitimacy of a marriage, courts of justice are bound to
54

Johnstone v Connolly (1869), 1 RL 253, [1869] JQ No 1 (QL) (QCA).

55

See Walters, supra note 36 at 352.

56

Ibid at 365.

57

Robb v Robb (1891), 20 OR 591, 3 CNLC 613 (H Ct J (Com Pleas
Div)) [Robb cited to OR].

58

Auger, supra note 8 at 16–17.
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decide in favour of the alleged marriage.”59 The Court held
that since the marriage met the requirements of a valid civil
marriage—it
was
consensual,
permanent,
and
monogamous—it was valid under Canadian law.
Finally in this category, and perhaps most
interestingly since it is one of the few cases to deal with
Indigenous-law marriages after the introduction of
Canadian law to the territories concerned, is Noah Estate
(Re).60 Noah was an Inuk from Cape Dyer on Baffin Island,
who married Igah “in accordance with Eskimo custom.”61
When Noah died, neither Igah nor their daughter Jeannie
could claim his estate or survivor benefits if they were not
legally married. The Department of Northern Affairs
argued that Igah was simply Noah’s “concubine” since,
when Noah died, they were engaged in an Inuit custom of
a trial marriage.62
Justice Sissons forcefully rejected this argument.
He opined that the “suggestion that Noah did not wish to
marry Igah but to have her as his concubine is pure
fantasy.”63 The two had adhered to every requirement that
Inuit culture demanded of them for a valid marriage,
59

Robb, supra note 57 at 597, quoting Connolly, supra note 29 at para
167.

60

(1961), 32 DLR (2d) 185, 1961 CanLII 442 (NWTTC) [Noah Estate
cited to DLR].

61

Ibid at 195. Note that Noah and Igah do not have Europeanized
surnames. Instead, alpha-numeric codes (which have been omitted
here) are used to identify them (ibid at 188).

62

Ibid at 195.

63

Ibid at 197.
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including obtaining their parents’ consent and cohabiting
until his death.64 The fact that the marriage did not strictly
comply with the Marriage Ordinance65 of the North West
Territories was inconsequential since that statute contained
no provision that an Indigenous marriage was invalid,66
and in any case, Noah’s marriage “seems to comply in
every respect with the requirements of what was known,
according to the old law of England, as a consensual
marriage, that is formed or existing by mere consent.”67
Sissons J. concluded that “[i]t would be monstrous to hold
that the law of England respecting the solemnization of
marriage is applicable to them.”68 Thus, the marriage was
valid—as in Connolly—because it fit the requirements of a
civil marriage under English common law, but also
because Canadian legislation, which was in force within
the territory at the time of solemnization, did not directly
invalidate it.69

64

Ibid.

65

RONWT 1956, c 64.

66

Noah Estate, supra note 60 at 199.

67

Ibid at 197.

68

Ibid at 200, quoting The Queen v Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka, (1889) 1 Terr L
Rep 211 (Terr Ct) at 215 [Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka].

69

Notably, Justice Sissons was the first to recognize the validity of
customary adoptions in Katie’s Adoption Petition (Re) (1961), 32 DLR
(2d) 686, 1961 CanLII 443 (NWTTC), in the same year and following
largely the same logic. See also WG Morrow, “Mr. Justice John
Howard Sissons” (1966) 5:2 Alta L Rev 254 at 258.

86
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2. Wives’ Evidence Cases
We have already seen in Williams that Canadian courts
were prepared to apply the common law privilege of noncompellability of spouses to Indigenous-law marriages if
they fit the requirements for validity as set out in Connolly.
In that case, Jennie Williams was held not to be a
compellable witness because she was, at the time of the
alleged murder of Ernest Jack, the wife of Tom Williams.70
Yet just as in Connolly, the fact that Tom and Jennie were
actually divorced according to Kwakwaka’wakw custom
by the time of the trial was irrelevant since, although their
marriage could be analogized to a European marriage,
such a divorce was repugnant to European law and so could
not be recognized.71
The judgment in Williams relied on the prior
decision in The Queen v Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka, where the
accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm.72
The Crown sought to introduce the evidence of two
women, Maggie and Keewasens, but the defence argued
that they were both his wives according to his
(unidentified) Indigenous custom. Justice Wetmore held
that such marriages were valid provided that they were
consensual and “neither of the parties had a husband or
wife, as the case might be, living at the time.”73 Therefore,
although the accused’s first marriage with Maggie was held
70
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to be valid, and so her testimony could not be compelled,
the second marriage with Keewasens was invalid because
it was polygamous.74 While the case is notable for
recognizing, as in Noah Estate, that Indigenous-law
marriages could validly be entered into even after the
reception of English law,75 they were again only
recognized so far as they aligned with the rights and
requirements of civil marriages.
This is also seen in Ex Parte Cote,76 where Barbara
Cote was found guilty of contempt after she refused to
testify in the trial of her Indigenous-law husband, Wilfred
Severight. While a lower court held that Barbara’s
marriage satisfied both the requirements of her own culture
and the above-noted requirements for recognition as a civil
marriage,77 the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
overturned this decision based on the Court’s opinion that
the relationship was not a marriage at all, but simply a
common-law relationship, which are not afforded the
privilege of non-compellability.78 Although Barbara likely
would have had such protection were she found to be in a
proper Indigenous-law marriage, the Court did not see their
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relationship in this light.79 In this respect, the case was
almost certainly wrongly decided: Barbara and Wilfred
were inarguably married according to their customs, and
she should have been afforded the same protections granted
to other spouses in Canadian courts.80
3. Polygamy Cases
Despite the fact that polygamy was historically fairly
common among some Indigenous Peoples,81 the practice
was only banned in 1890 to target the influx of Mormons
into southern Alberta,82 and there is a relative dearth of case
law for prosecutions. As we have seen in the case of NanE-Quis-A-Ka, this could possibly be attributed to the fact
79

Alan Hilton, in his case comment “The Validity of Common Law
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(at the time) covered the field and so barred Indigenous-law marriages
(ibid at 582). This argument ignores that provincial laws are
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Indigenous identity, which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal Parliament (see e.g. Dick v R, [1985] 2 SCR 309 at para 12,
1985 CanLII 80). Further, Hilton’s suggestion that the mere mention
of the Doukhobor sect within The Marriage Act implies an exclusion
of all other distinct marriage-solemnization practices lacks
substantiation.
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that plural Indigenous-law marriages were, for the most
part, treated as being invalid. No offence was committed
despite the alleged immorality of such relationships83
because the subsequent marriage was not seen as a
marriage at all.
However, The Queen v “Bear’s Shin Bone”
represents one such case.84 The accused was married to two
women, “Free Cutter Woman” and “Killed Herself”,
according to the customs of the Blood Indian Tribe.85
Relying on Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka, the Court held that such
relationships fell within the definition of polygamy. Both
women “were living with him as his wives, and…there was
a form of contract between the parties which they supposed
binding upon them.”86 Accordingly, the accused was
convicted.
B. RECOGNITION IN THE CONSTITUTION
This was the state of the law in Canada prior to 1982.
Indigenous-law marriages were recognized on an ad hoc
basis, but only when they could be analogized to civil
marriages and when such a finding of validity was
necessary in order to determine a distinct issue. This
picture changed only slightly after the affirmation of
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Aboriginal rights within s. 35 of the CA, 1982,87 since such
marriages will likely be recognized as being Aboriginal
rights “in appropriate situations.”88 While Indigenous-law
marriages have received some level of constitutional
protection within Canadian law, we shall see that such
protection is still largely dependent upon the very specific
circumstances of the matter at hand, and can still only be
confirmed on a case-by-case basis.
This dependency on circumstances arises because
establishing the existence of an Aboriginal right within the
complicated system of s. 35 jurisprudence that has
developed over the last forty years requires that individuals
claiming such a right prove that they were acting in
accordance with “a practice, custom or tradition integral to
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the
right.”89 Further, such a practice must have been in
existence prior to contact between that Indigenous group
and Europeans,90 and must not have been extinguished by
the Crown prior to the constitutional protection of
Aboriginal rights in 1982.91 Therefore, an Aboriginal right
to marry in accordance with a particular custom could
exist, but must still be proven by a claimant on the
evidence, and the opportunity to do so will still only arise
in situations where the claimant is before the court for some

87
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other issue and the validity of the marriage must be proven
in order to solve that issue.
Meeting the high bar established by the s. 35
jurisprudence can be particularly difficult for a claimant in
such a situation since the marital customs among various
Indigenous nations are, to say the least, intricate and
diverse. Indeed, Morse states that “[i]t is virtually
impossible for anyone, especially someone trained in the
law, to describe the family laws of the Indian, the Métis,
and the Inuit peoples of Canada in [anything] other than
broad generalities.”92 A few brief examples can
demonstrate the “practices, customs and traditions”93 of
marriage solemnization among Indigenous Peoples in
Canada which a s. 35 claimant would have to prove that
they were carrying out, and where even slight deviations or
evidence of post-European-contact developments could
lead to invalidity of their marriage.
We have already seen in Noah Estate that Inuit
custom on Baffin Island requires a trial marriage with the
consent of both families.94 This is similar to the Dakota,
except that that nation does not consider the trial to have
begun until several weeks of cohabitation have already
elapsed, and the trial must last for over a year before the
community considers the couple to be permanently
married.95 Unlike the Inuit of Baffin Island, however, no
parental consent or dowry is required among the Dakota,
92
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and there is no ceremony or formal solemnization.96 The
ceremonies among the Cree are much more formal, where
the law requires a suitor to “present gifts to the woman’s
parents and to obtain their initial consent to the marriage.
The young couple then go to all the elders of the
community with token presents and ask for their
blessing.”97 An elaborate day-long ceremony is then
conducted, and the couple is not formally wed until it is
complete.
Among the Northern Ojibwe a potential husband
must go to his parents and ask them to arrange a marriage
with the parents of his potential wife.98 His parents will
usually initiate this conversation with her parents by
bringing a gift, and once both sets of parents consent to the
union and determine that the appropriate kinship
requirements are met, the couple can marry one another.99
Kinship requirements are also particularly important to the
nations of the Iroquois Confederacy where matriarchal clan
mothers will arrange marriages with the requirement that
brides and grooms come from different clans;100
meanwhile, “Interior Salish and Carrier Indians entirely
prohibit marriage within the bands, as all band members
are considered brothers and sisters.”101
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As was the case with Jennie Williams, many
nations require a bride-price to be paid to obtain a spouse,
which can then be repaid to effectuate a divorce. Some
Inuit groups additionally require from the husband “a
promise to adhere to the ‘bride-service’ custom by which
he hunts and fishes for her family for up to a year.”102
Husbands among the Kwakwaka’wakw people have to pay
a dowry to the bride’s father or guardian, but the wife can
repay the husband “usually twice or three times the amount
he gave for her” in order to divorce herself.103 However,
among the Dakota104 and the Northern Ojibwe105 couples
can divorce simply by leaving the matrimonial home and
going their own way, in which case they are free to
remarry.
Any couple that weds one another in adherence to
such customs would be married according to their own
laws and in accordance with an Aboriginal right protected
by s. 35. But from the perspective of the state—as we saw
with Barbara Cote—they would simply be in a commonlaw relationship and potentially without the rights and
protections enjoyed by other spouses in the dominant
culture until such an Aboriginal right has been verified in
court. Proving the validity of their marriage would require
one or both spouses to demonstrate: (1) that the “custom”
of their wedding was integral to their distinctive precontact Indigenous culture; (2) that they were married in
strict adherence to this custom; and (3) that such a marriage
102
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103
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custom had not been extinguished by the Crown prior to
1982. Any failure in this process could have the potentially
dire consequence of nullifying what they believed and
intended to be a lawful marriage.
Such a tragic outcome was seen in Manychief v
Poffenroth106 where Delia Manychief believed herself to be
married to Darrel Daniels according to her Blood Indian
custom. Darrel was killed in a car accident in 1990 after
they had been “married” for eight years, and Delia sought
survivor benefits as his wife under Alberta’s Fatal
Accidents Act.107 The Court examined her evidence, where
she testified that she and Darrel obtained their parents’
consent and the advice of an elder before they commenced
living together in 1982.108 Although she did not claim him
as her spouse on her income tax returns, she understood
herself to be married in “[their] way of life.”109 The Court
also heard from “Priscilla Bruised Head, an elder of the
band, [who] testified as an expert on Indian customs.”110
Priscilla claimed that marriages used to be arranged on the
Reserve, but that younger couples now preferred to be
married in church ceremonies, something which Delia and
Darrel planned to do one day.111
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Justice McBain recognized that an Indigenous-law
marriage was an Aboriginal right guaranteed by s. 35, but
only if it could be shown that such a custom was “an
‘integral part’ of a ‘distinctive’ [A]boriginal culture.”112
While the Court rightly acknowledged that Alberta’s
Marriage Act113 did not extinguish any such Aboriginal
right, nor could it as a provincial statute, Delia Manychief
failed to establish that she had acted in accordance with an
Aboriginal right when she married Darrel. The marriage
was not arranged, as Priscilla Bruised Head testified had
occurred in the past, nor was there any exchange of gifts or
delivery of the bride.114 Thus, the Court held that “the
relationship in the case at bar was nothing more than the
type of common-law relationship one frequently sees in the
non-[N]ative community,” and Delia was not a “wife”
under the FAA.115
C. CRITIQUE
Manychief clearly demonstrates that, despite being
recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the CA, 1982,
Indigenous-law marriages in Canada largely remain in the
same legal position as they were before 1982. Not only
must they be proven on the evidence on an ad hoc basis,
but even when they are, they are recognized as being
substantively and functionally identical to a civil marriage.
None of the special rights or privileges that the specific
112
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Indigenous culture might understand to be attendant upon
their marriage transfer into the Canadian legal system, and
marriages which do not meet the civil marriage
requirements of voluntariness, permanence, and
exclusivity are unlikely to be recognized at all. Essentially,
they are treated as a foreign-solemnized marriage
functioning within Canadian law.
Hence, the Canadian method of recognition is best
described as “Admittance as Fact.”116 The validity of an
Indigenous-law marriage is dependent upon the evidence
presented to establish its existence and, even when such a
marriage is acknowledged, it only goes as far as to
demonstrate the legal fact that a marriage has occurred,
which must then be applied to Canadian law. Thus, there
are two fundamentally problematic aspects to this method
of recognition: the admittance aspect, which places an
unjustly high evidentiary burden on the spouses of the
union to establish its existence, and the fact aspect, which
strips the marriage of all its inherent value and forces it into
a European mould.
First, as was seen in all the cases that we have
examined, the mere task of having an Indigenous-law
marriage admitted by a court as having occurred at all is a
herculean labour compared to the ease of proving a
solemnized and registered civil marriage. Indigenous
marital practices are intricate, complicated, diverse, and

116
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often concealed from those outside the community,117
involving traditions and spiritual rituals that date back long
before written records could document any particular
requirements of solemnization. Morse states that “[i]t is
impossible to delineate a single set of principles adhered to
by all native people.”118 Yet the Canadian method of
recognition expects not only that spouses will be able to
properly and fully enunciate their distinctive cultural
practices and their own strict adherence to them, but also—
and more problematically—that the judge will be able to
detect the subtle but decisive nuances in solemnization and
determine whether these resulted in a valid marriage.
Walters phrases this dilemma succinctly:
For a judge to identify one norm from this set
of complex and shifting normative narratives
and practices and enforce it with the crispness
of a common law rule, in effect detaching it
from the structures of governance out of
which it emerges, may do far more damage
than good.119
Further, by requiring Indigenous solemnization
practices to have been in existence before European contact
as a requirement for state recognition, the Canadian
method has essentially frozen the cultural development of
Indigenous legal traditions. In Manychief, McBain J.
117
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opined that even if Delia Manychief and Darrel Daniels
were married according to their Blood Indian custom, “it is
accurate to say that right has now evolved to the point
where it is no longer an integral component of the Natives’
traditional way of life or culture.”120 Unless an Indigenous
group maintains their solemnization practices precisely as
they existed pre-contact, such practices will be deemed to
be non-Indigenous, or non-integral. As Sheleff argues,
such an arbitrary temporal requirement “dooms that very
culture to stagnation, and ultimately rejection, by imposing
on it a rigidity which is generally by no means inherent in
its nature.”121
Second, even once a marriage is admitted, the legal
fact that the spouses will establish is simply that a civil
marriage was solemnized in an unusual way. Any
proprietary or patrimonial consequences, and any potential
for divorce or redemption according to Indigenous laws,
evaporates upon recognition by the Canadian legal system.
Instead, the spouses must adhere to a system of family laws
which, in all likelihood, is not only foreign to the practical
needs of their society, but also to the spiritual,
cosmological, and axiological demands of their culture.
What can the Canadian family-law system say to placate
the ancestor spirits of the Kwakwaka’wakw people in a
divorce proceeding? How should the common law handle
the return of Jennie Williams’s bride-price? As Aaron
Mills argues, “[o]ne can’t simply translate law across

120
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121
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distinct constitutional contexts and expect it to retain its
integrity and thus its functionality.”122
By misrecognizing Indigenous-law marriages as
being equivalent to civil marriages, the Canadian method
of recognition merely continues to position the European
model of marriage as being authoritative—it is the scale on
which all Indigenous-law marriages will be weighed and
found wanting. In short, the Canadian Admittance as Fact
method perpetuates a form of cultural and political
violence by misrecognizing Indigenous-law marriages as
being at once less-than and foreign-to civil marriages, but
good enough to be recognized as such for the narrow
purposes of Canadian family law.
III. SOUTH AFRICA – CODIFICATION
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
As a young democracy, South Africa is widely regarded as
having a remarkably progressive constitution,123 and a
liberal system of laws that have arisen from it.124 South
122
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Africa is a nation which has grown, within the last
generation, to place a high value upon the traditional laws
of its Indigenous peoples125 and to treat those laws on an
equal footing with the colonial English and Roman-Dutch
legal systems that the democracy inherited.126 Indeed, as
Deputy Chief Justice Langa—as he then was—of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa stated in a seminal
case dealing with the application of customary law,
“[c]ertain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond
doubt that our basic law specifically requires that
customary law should be accommodated, not merely
tolerated, as part of South African law, provided the
particular rules or provisions are not in conflict with the
Constitution.”127

an Indigenous Legal Pluralism within the South African Dispensation:
Possible or Not?” (2021) 54:1 De Jure 54 at 54.
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Nevertheless, South Africa’s recognition of
Indigenous-law marriages still evinces many of the same
issues that we have identified within Canada’s method of
recognition, by casting aside most of their distinct
substantive and spiritual features if they are unable to fit
within the civil marriage mould. Moreover, as we shall see,
South Africa’s method of codifying the validity and status
of Indigenous-law marriages creates its own unique set of
problems: by forcing compliance with a statutory system
that is, in many respects, foreign both practically and
philosophically to the Indigenous participants; and by
freezing the development of Indigenous marital practices
through judicial precedents that must be complied with.
Before critiquing their method of recognition,
however, it is necessary to establish the basic functioning
of South Africa’s statutory Indigenous-law marriage
system. Prior to the enactment of the RCMA,128 and prior
to the recognition of traditional law’s role within s. 211 of
the CRSA,129 Indigenous-law marriages were not
recognized at all within South African law. I.P. Maithufi
and J.C. Bekker argue that “customary marriages were, for
all intents and purposes, not recognised by the South
African legal system as they were polygamous or
potentially polygamous. Consequently, these marriages
were held to be contrary to public policy and the principles

lens, it must now be seen as part of our law and must be considered on
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of natural justice.”130 As a result, none of the consequences
of that marriage were recognized by the state: a spouse in
such a union could conduct a civil marriage with someone
else, the spouses owed one another no duty of support, and
the children of such unions would be regarded as
illegitimate.131
Instead, Indigenous-law marriages were seen as a
peculiar legal creature referred to as a “customary
union”—the term “marriage” being carefully avoided—
and were governed by s. 22 of the Black Administration
Act.132 Under this statute, such unions were considered as
being a mere contract between the two families regarding
130
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cohabitation and the payment of a bride-price.133 Of course,
since the couple were not really married, they were free to
marry one another in a civil marriage under the Marriage
Act, 1961.134 However, in such a scenario the BAA stated
that the marriage was not in a community of property.135 In
place of this otherwise standard proprietary system, the
“customary marriage was deemed to have created a
‘house,’”136 which the BAA defined as “the family and
property, rights and status, which commence with, attach
to, and arise out of, the customary union of each native
woman.”137 In other words, a separate estate was deemed
to have been created with each customary union, whose
property was allocated to the wife based on customary
practices, and which was distinct from the husband’s own
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property or any other “houses” which might come into
existence among his other potential wives.138
While the BAA was amended in 1988 to modernize
some of the proprietary consequences of such unions,139
major reform for Indigenous-law marriages did not occur
until the passing of the RCMA in 1998, and its coming into
force on November 15, 2000.140 Inspired by s. 211 of the
CRSA’s admonition for courts to “apply customary law
when that law is applicable,”141 the RCMA officially
recognized customary marriages entered into both before
and after the commencement of the Act. Section 2
specifically states that “a marriage which is a valid
marriage at customary law and existing at the
commencement of this Act is for all purposes recognised as
a marriage,”142 and that a customary marriage “entered into
after the commencement of this Act, which complies with
the requirements of this Act, is for all purposes recognised
as a marriage.”143
Notably—given the fears over polygamy within the
BAA and its era—the RCMA also specifically recognizes
plural customary marriages, both those entered into before

138

See Maithufi & Bekker, supra note 130 at 188. See also Nhlapo &
Himonga, supra note 130 at 209.

139

See Mdluli, supra note 133.

140
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CRSA, supra note 123, s 211(3).
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RCMA, supra note 18, s 2(1) [emphasis added].
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and after the commencement of the Act.144 It lays out a set
of requirements in order for future customary marriages to
be valid,145 and carefully details the method of registration
that the spouses must follow.146 The Act also sets out the
proprietary consequences of customary marriages, stating
that monogamous marriages are automatically “in [a]
community of property and of profit and loss between the
spouses, unless such consequences are specifically
excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract which
regulates the matrimonial property system of their
marriage.”147

144

Ibid, ss 2(3)–(4). Note that many scholars observe that, despite this
recognition of polygamy, the RCMA appears to be designed to restrict
this practice: see Thandabantu Nhlapo, “Customary Law in PostApartheid South Africa: Constitutional Culture, Gender and ‘Living
Law’” (2017) 33:1 SAJHR 1 at 11; Morudu & Maimela, supra note
124 at 62–63.
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See RCMA, supra note 18, s 3.

146

See ibid, s 4. As we shall see below, failure to register does not
officially invalidate a marriage (ibid, s 4(9)).

147

Ibid, s 7(2). Note that all monogamous customary marriages are
automatically in a community of property, despite s 7(1), which states
that “the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage entered
into before the commencement of this Act continue to be governed by
customary law.” The Constitutional Court in Gumede (born Shange) v
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, [2008] ZACC
23, 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) held that this distinction was
unconstitutional by arbitrarily singling out spouses of customary
marriages solemnized before November 15, 2000, and potentially
detrimentally affecting them by customary systems of matrimonial
property. In Ramuhovhi and Others v President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others, [2017] ZACC 41, 2018 (2) BCLR 217 (CC)
this same provision was declared invalid with regards to polygamous
marriages entered into before the commencement of the RCMA.
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For polygamous marriages, in contrast, husbands
are required to “make an application to the court to approve
a written contract which will regulate the future
matrimonial property system of his marriages.”148 Such
contracts will typically create a proprietary system similar
to the “houses” of the BAA.149 However, a failure to make
such a contract before entering into a polygamous marriage
has been held not to nullify the subsequent marriage, which
would simply be out of a community of property.150
As with civil marriages, spouses in a customary
marriage may only divorce one another by obtaining a
decree of divorce from the High Court.151 Unlike civil
148

RCMA, supra note 18 at s 7(6). Penelope E Andrews, in her article
“Who's Afraid of Polygamy - Exploring the Boundaries of Family,
Equality and Custom in South Africa” (2009) 11:2 Utah L Rev 351,
suggests that the RCMA envisages women entering into polygamous
marriages with more than one man, or that gay men could enter into
polygamous marriages with more than one man (ibid at 377). This
argument is fatally flawed. It ignores that the RCMA permits “a
husband” to enter into polygamous marriages, thus precluding
heterosexual polyandry; and that the RCMA requires marriages to be
celebrated according to customary law (RCMA, supra note 18,
s 3(1)(b)), thus precluding homosexual polyandry, since this author
knows of no South African cultures that are customarily homosexually
polyandrous. See also Kovacs, Ndashe & Williams, supra note 132 at
276; Higgins, Fenrich & Tanzer, supra note 124 at 1695; Nhlapo &
Himonga, supra note 130 at 205.

149

See Papa IP Maithufi, “The Requirements for Validity and Proprietary
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in South Africa: Some Observations” (2015) 48:2 De Jure 261 at 273.
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See Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another, [2013] ZACC 14 at paras 6,
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636.
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marriages, however, such a decree will only be granted if
there has been an irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage,152 whereas with a civil marriage a decree of
divorce can also be obtained in circumstances of mental
illness or continued unconsciousness of one of the
spouses.153 Couples in a customary marriage are also
permitted to enter into a civil marriage with one another—
which would have the effect of supplanting the customary
marriage—but only if it is a monogamous marriage, and
the husband would then be barred from entering into a
subsequent polygamous marriage.154
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR VALIDITY
As we saw, the RCMA recognizes customary marriages
that were in existence at its commencement and recognizes
a marriage entered into after this date “which complies
with the requirements of this Act.”155 While the statutory
requirements are relatively few, their interpretation and
expansion by the courts have turned compliance into a
dizzying labyrinth of responsibilities. Failure to observe
either the requirements of the Act or the requirements of
152

See RCMA, supra note 18, s 8(2).

153

See Divorce Act, 1979 (S Afr), No 70 of 1979, s 3(b). See Nhlapo &
Himonga, supra note 130 at 254–64 for an exploration of the issues
surrounding divorce and the RCMA’s interactions with customary law.

154

See RCMA, supra note 18, s 10; Osman, “Million Rand Question”,
supra note 135 for a fulsome discussion on the problems of such “dual
marriages.” See also Fatima Osman, “The Consequences of the
Statutory Regulation of Customary Law: An Examination of the South
African Customary Law of Succession and Marriage” (2019) 22:1
Potchefstroom Elec LJ 1 at 10 [Osman, “Statutory Regulation”].
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one’s customary law can lead to an invalid marriage and
the loss of its attendant rights and protections. Faced with
this complicated threat, Maithufi and Bekker rightly ask:
“Do people who are married by customary law understand
what it is all about? Can they visualize the
consequences?”156
In any case, we must attempt to visualize and
understand what it is all about. The RCMA contains two
primary requirements for validity which we will explore:
that the parties must be over the age of eighteen and
consent to the marriage; and that the marriage must be
negotiated and entered in accordance with customary
law.157 Further, while the Act states that unregistered
customary marriages are not invalid solely by this lapse,158
registration is a practical necessity since it functions as
proof of the marriage for all government—and most nongovernment—organizations, such that registration is
essentially an additional requirement for validity.159 Each
of these are worth exploration.

156

Supra note 130 at 197. See also Nhlapo, supra note 144 at 11; Aubrey
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(2017) 38:2 Obiter 438 at 442.
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1. Age and Consent
The requirement that both spouses be above the age of
eighteen is one that, on its face, appears uncontroversial but
has nonetheless generated considerable discussion largely
beyond the scope of this essay.160 For our purposes it is
only necessary to note that, while the requirement exists,
there are both statutory exceptions161 and practical
circumventions162 that make its enforcement challenging in
communities living under traditional law. Likewise, the
condition that both prospective spouses consent to the
marriage would also be uncontroversial in civil marriages,
but this is not so straightforward a requirement under South
African customary law. This is because the cultures that
practice such unions almost invariably call for the consent
of each spouse’s family to be obtained before the marriage
would be considered valid under customary law, rather
than merely obtaining the consent of the two
160

The controversy primarily surrounds the practice of ukuthwala, a
simulated abduction of a young woman as a preliminary to marriage.
See Lea Mwambene & Julia Sloth-Nielsen, “Benign Accommodation?
Ukuthwala, ‘Forced Marriage’ and the South African Children’s Act”
(2011) 11:1 Afr Hum Rts LJ 1. See also Elena Moore & Chuma
Himonga, “Living Customary Law and Families in South Africa” in
Katherine Hall et al, eds, South African Child Gauge 2018: Children,
Families and the State: Collaboration and Contestation (Cape Town:
Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town, 2018) 61 at 63.

161

See RCMA, supra note 18, s 3(4)–(5).
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See e.g. Chuma Himonga & Elena Moore, “Reform of Customary
Marriage, Divorce and Succession in South Africa: Living Customary
Law and Social Realities” (2015) University of Cape Town Working
Paper
at
14,
online:
<www.academia.edu/15842003/Reform_of_Customary_Marriage_Di
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participants.163 As the High Court stated in Motsoatsoa v
Roro and Others, “a customary marriage in true African
tradition…is not about the bride and the groom. It involves
two families.”164
This reasoning was laid out more fully by the High
Court in Fanti v Boto and Others,165 where the “consent of
the bride’s father or guardian” was explicitly listed as a
requirement to prove the existence of a customary
marriage.166 The Court stated bluntly: “The fact of the
matter is that the customary marriage is and remains an
agreement between two (2) families.”167 This reasoning
was favourably adopted by another decision out of the
High Court, where it was held that
One of the important elements that
distinguish a customary marriage from a
common law marriage is that the former
163

Note that the statute’s language, while only specifically addressing the
consent of the participants to the marriage, implies such familial
consent through the condition that the prospective spouses “consent to
be married to each other under customary law” (RCMA, supra note 18,
s 3(1)(a)(ii) [emphasis added]). Chuma Himonga and Elena Moore
suggest that such “dual consent” (i.e. consent to marry one another, and
consent to marry under customary law) consequently includes the
families’ consent, since customary practices such as those discussed
below necessarily require this. See Chuma Himonga & Elena Moore,
Reform of Customary Marriage, Divorce and Succession in South
Africa (Claremont, SA: Juta Law, 2015) at 79. See also Manthwa,
supra note 156 at 442.
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establishes marital bonds between the family
of the bride and the family of the groom
whereas the latter establishes a bond of
marriage between the groom and the bride
only.168
Thus, the Act incorporates the Indigenous-law concept that
consent involves more than just the two spouses agreeing
to the marriage. Rather, consent is a family affair.
In Fanti the Court explained that such familial
consent often materializes in the form of an extensive ritual
involving both families.169 One such ritual is described in
Motsoatsoa, where Justice Matlapeng wrote:
[E]missaries are sent by the man’s family to
the woman’s family to indicate interest in the
possible marriage (this of course presupposes
that the two parties man and woman have
agreed to marry each other); a meeting of the
parties’ relatives will be convened where
lobolo [bride-price] is negotiated and the
negotiated lobolo or part thereof is handed
over to the woman’s family and the two
families will agree on the formalities and date
on which the woman will then be handed over
to the man’s family which handing over may
include but not necessarily be accompanied
by celebration (wedding).170
168

Rasello v Chali and Others, 2013 ZAFSHC 182 at para 16 [Rasello].
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Fanti, supra note 165 at para 22.

170

Motsoatso, supra note 164 at para 17.
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In that case, the family of the deceased wife contested that
a customary marriage had occurred since they had not
consented to any such marriage, even though they had
impliedly consented to the parties’ cohabitation. The Court
agreed that their consent was required and ruled that no
marriage had occurred.171
This requirement is further complicated when we
turn to consider polygamous marriages. In such cases,
South African courts have held that consent must be
obtained from both the prospective husband’s and bride’s
families, as well as from any existing spouse(s), since they
stand to be detrimentally affected by the proprietary
consequences of the union—not to mention the conjugal
consequences. In MG v BM and Others,172 the wife of BM
claimed that she had not consented to the polygamous
marriage between her deceased husband and the applicant,
MG.173 She argued this position despite the fact that she
was present during the ritual negotiations, and had
participated in joint family functions with MG and her
children by BM.174 The Court agreed that her consent was
likely required, but such a determination was unnecessary
as the evidence “overwhelmingly” indicated that she had
consented, adding a superfluous barb that her “sudden
change of heart…is most likely motived by the greed to
exclude the applicant from the assets of the deceased.”175

171
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However, in Mayelane the Constitutional Court
definitively held that the consent of a prior spouse was
required for the validity of a subsequent polygamous
marriage. In that case, Modjadji Mayelane claimed that she
had not consented to the marriage between her husband,
Hlengani Moyana, and the respondent, Mphephu
Ngwenyama.176 While the lower courts177 had focused on
the relevant provisions of the RCMA and largely ignored
the issue of consent,178 the Constitutional Court held that
“the consent of the first wife is necessary for the validity of
a subsequent marriage.”179
Notably, the Court achieved this result by
developing the Xitsonga customary law of the parties to
comply with the values of “human dignity and equality” as
espoused in the CRSA.180 This was the first time the Court
had engaged in such “an incremental development of
customary law,”181 although s. 39(2) of the CRSA enjoins
courts to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
176

Mayelane, supra note 150 at para 4. See also IP Maithufi, “Case
Comment on Modjadji Florah Mayelane v Mphephu Maria
Ngwenyama” (2013) 46:4 De Jure 1078.

177

See Ngwenyama v Mayelane and Another, 2012 ZASCA 94 at paras
24, 38 [MM].

178

See Mayelane, supra note 150 at paras 6–7. See also Liz Lewis,
“Judicial ‘Translation’ and Contextualization of Values: Rethinking
the Development of Customary Law in Mayelane” (2015) 18:4 PELJ
1126 at 1129.

179
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Mayelane, supra note 150 at para 43. See also Helen Kruuse & Julia
Sloth-Nielsen, “Sailing between Scylla and Charybdis: Mayelane v
Ngwenyama” (2014) 17:4 PELJ 1710 at 1729.
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of Rights” when “developing the common law or
customary law,”182 and although the Court had the
opportunity to do so in prior cases.183 Faced with this
constitutional obligation to develop rights-infringing
customary laws, the Court held that the protections of
dignity and equality in the Bill of Rights made it necessary
for a husband to obtain his first wife’s permission before
entering into a subsequent marriage. If Xitsonga customary
law did not require the consent of the first spouse, the Court
argued that it should, and applied what the relevant
customary law should be rather than what it was.184 This is
182

CRSA, supra note 123 at s 39(2).

183

See especially Bhe, supra note 127, where the majority declined to
develop the relevant customary law regarding intestate succession,
citing a lack of evidence necessary to do so (at para 109). Instead, the
Court elected to declare that the customary law at issue was
unconstitutionally incompatible with the Bill of Rights, while
modifying the Intestate Succession Act, 1987 (S Afr), No 81 of 1987
to include polygamous marriages until the legislature enacted a
comprehensive succession scheme (at paras 115, 124). Justice Ngcobo,
in dissent, would have developed the “Indigenous law so as to bring it
in line with the Bill of Rights” (at para 148) as the CRSA, supra note
123, s 39(2) requires. For other approaches that courts have taken when
dealing with potentially unconstitutional customary laws, see Christa
Rautenbach, “Case Law as an Authoritative Source of Customary Law:
Piecemeal Recording of (Living) Customary Law?” (2019) 22 PELJ 1.

184

Kruuse and Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 181 at 1729, point out that the
Court equivocates by arguing both that Xitsonga customary law
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development since Xitsonga customary law lacked this requirement.
See Mayelane, supra note 150 at para 87. See also Nhlapo & Himonga,
supra note 130 at 206, 240–41 for an analysis of the debate surrounding
whether this decision applies to all customary marriages, or only those
conducted according to Xitsonga custom. On this point, see also Lea
Mwambene, “The Essence Vindicated? Courts and Customary
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but a hint of the potential issues with South Africa’s
method of recognition: although customary laws are
utilized to judge a case, those laws are subject to being
developed at the whim of the courts to attain the
“constitutional norm of equality.”185 Indeed, courts are
obligated to do so.
2. In Accordance with Custom
The second statutory requirement for a valid customary
marriage is the rather nebulous condition that “the marriage
must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in
accordance with customary law.”186 While this is a highly
contextual matter, two primary elements have emerged
from the jurisprudence to satisfy this provision: that the
groom pay a bride-price—called “lobolo”—to the bride’s
family; and that the bride’s family deliver her to the groom.
“Lobolo” is defined in s. 1(iv) of the RCMA as “the
property in cash or in kind…which a prospective husband
or the head of his family undertakes to give to the head of
the prospective wife’s family in consideration of a
customary marriage.”187 Essentially, it is a bride-price to be
paid to the bride’s family in return for her delivery.
Although lobolo is never explicitly stated in the Act as
Marriages in South Africa” (2017) 17:1 Afr Hum Rts LJ 35 at 36;
Nhlapo v Mahlangu and Others, 2015 ZAGPPHC 142 at para 33.
185

Mayelane, supra note 150 at para 84. Alternatively—as in Bhe, supra
note 127—a court could simply strike down the customary law as being
unconstitutional in the same way that any other statutory or common
law could be invalidated.

186
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187

Ibid, s 1(iv).
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being a requirement for the validity of a customary
marriage, almost all cultures that practice such unions in
South Africa traditionally engage in the practice of lobolo,
thus making it an essential component of a wedding
celebrated in accordance with customary law under
s. 3(1)(b). Indeed, Maithufi and Bekker argue that “it is
difficult to imagine a customary marriage without a lobolo
agreement. Lobolo is so inextricably bound up with
marriage amongst African societies, that its existence is
regarded as proof that a customary marriage has been
contracted.”188 Kirsty Button, Elena Moore, and Chuma
Himonga confirmed this opinion in a survey they
conducted in 2016, where thirty-three out of thirty-nine
customarily married respondents “perceived that lobolo
should be negotiated and transferred in customary
marriages. These findings indicate normative beliefs about
the importance of lobolo in customary marriage.”189
These academic and public opinions have been
confirmed by judicial opinion as well. In M v M190 the
plaintiff wife sought a decree of divorce and division of
property, as the couple had customarily married one
another in a community of property.191 The defendant
husband countered that no marriage had ever occurred
since, although he had paid R2,000 as lobolo, this was only
188

Maithufi & Bekker, supra note 130 at 187.

189

Kirsty Button, Elena Moore & Chuma Himonga, “South Africa’s
System of Dispute Resolution Forums: The Role of the Family and the
State in Customary Marriage Dissolution” (2016) 42:2 J of S Afr S 299
at 309 [emphasis in original].
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191
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a deposit and he never completed his payment to her
family.192 Justice Ebersohn of the High Court, however,
was dubious, as the husband had registered their marriage
and the couple had a child together.193 Ebersohn J. found
that a valid marriage had occurred and ordered the divorce
and division of property without commenting on whether a
deposit of lobolo would have been sufficient to complete
the marriage.194
This was clarified in Mkabe v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others.195 Madala Mkabe claimed that he had
married his deceased wife Ntombi Mbungela according to
her Tsonga customs, though he himself was Swazi.196 It
had been agreed that he would pay her family R12,000 as
lobolo, but in the actual circumstances he only paid
R9,000, “a living cow, a suit and [pair] of shoes for the
bride’s father, a two piece costume for the bride’s mother,
two boxes of snuff, liquor, and a case of beers.”197
Ntombi’s family claimed that he did not pay the full lobolo
that was agreed upon, so their marriage was invalid.198
Justice Twala opined that, regardless of the result that
either Swazi or Tsonga customary law would require of the
matter, “payment of ilobolo [sic] in full cannot be such an
essential requirement to invalidate a customary
192
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193
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194
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marriage.”199 If customary law would not allow a reprieve
for this lapse, it would have to be judicially developed to
allow for this, and the marriage was held to be valid.
After the full or partial payment of lobolo, the bride
must be handed over to the husband and integrated into his
household. Even if lobolo was fully paid, a failure to
conduct this ceremony in accordance with the spouses’
customary law would lead to invalidity of the marriage. As
Justice Dlodlo held in Fanti, “even if payment of lobolo is
properly alleged and proved that alone would not render a
relationship a valid customary marriage in the absence of
the other essential requirements.”200 Pieter Bakker also
argues that “[t]he integration of the bride is…the final step
parties need to take before they are regarded as married in
terms of customary law.”201
In Rasello v Chali and Others,202 the High Court
was tasked with determining the validity of Masefako
Rasello’s marriage to her deceased husband, David Chali.
David’s family claimed that, while cohabitation had
occurred, the two were not married since Masefako had not
been handed over in accordance with their Sesotho custom.
During a joint family gathering, Masefako’s family had
suggested marriage as a possibility, but David’s family
199

Ibid at para 35.

200

Fanti, supra note 165 at para 20 [emphasis in original].

201

Pieter Bakker, “Integration of the Bride as a Requirement for a Valid
Customary Marriage: Mkabe v Minister of Home Affairs [2016]
ZAGPPHC 460” (2018) 21 PELJ 1 at 7. See also Siyabonga Sibisi, “Is
the Requirement of Integration of the Bride Optional in Customary
Marriages?” (2020) 53 De Jure 90 at 103.
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scorned the offer and later rejected the suggestion that
lobolo had ever been paid.203 Justice Molemela scathingly
rejected Masefako’s claim, holding that the delivery of the
bride is “an essential requirement for the validity of a
customary marriage.”204 Since this had not occurred, the
alleged marriage was a nullity.
This same reasoning was applied in Ntoagae v
Makabanyane and Another205 where Justice Djaje argued
that, since a customary marriage was more about the
families than about the spouses, “[t]his therefore entails the
involvement of the two families from the inception of the
lobola [sic] negotiations to the ultimate handing over of the
bride.”206 In that case, Phistos Ntoagae applied to the High
Court to prohibit the family of Gaehumelwe Tsietso from
burying his deceased wife, since this was his sole right as
her husband after their Tswana customary marriage.207 The
Court found that no delivery of the bride had occurred and
that, despite Phistos’s claim that this was “a mere
technicality,” such delivery “is the most important and
final step in the chain of events and happens in the presence
of both the bride and the groom’s families. One can
describe this as the official seal in the African context, of
the customary marriage.”208
203

Ibid at paras 5–7.
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3. Registration
Although the RCMA requires that spouses register their
marriage with the Department of Home Affairs within
three months of its solemnization,209 the Act immediately
prevaricates by stating that the “[f]ailure to register a
customary marriage does not affect the validity of that
marriage.”210 Monica De Souza points out that this
legislative ambiguity is intentional, since automatically
voiding any unregistered customary marriages would be a
severe disadvantage to their primarily rural and
disconnected participants.211 Nevertheless, registration is
functionally a requirement as “many civil and private
institutions regard registration as the benchmark for
validity.”212 This presents the greatest practical flaw in
South Africa’s method of recognition.
Roxanne Juliane Kovacs, Sibongile Ndashe, and
Jennifer Williams conducted a study on the impact and
prevalence of registration, finding that 107,137 customary
marriages had been registered between the RCMA’s
implementation and 2008, but that only 10 per cent of those
“were registered in the year in which they occurred.”213
209
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Their research showed that most spouses only registered
when a certificate of registration was necessary, such as
after the death of a spouse or when applying for divorce.214
Even the South African government estimates that “only
between 4 and 8 per cent of customary marriages are
registered at all.”215
Unlike civil marriages, where certificates of
registration are issued immediately after the ceremony,
spouses in a customary marriage must go to an office of the
Department of Home Affairs and offer sufficient evidence
that a customary marriage has occurred.216 Besides the
burden of travel this places on the spouses—since
individuals living according to customary law will often
live in isolated areas—the requirement of proof creates the
additional problem of having to bring along witnesses,
documents, and anything else which may be needed to
convince the Department that the marriage has in fact
occurred.217 Moreover, if the registering officer is at all
unconvinced that the marriage was properly solemnized,
they are obligated to refuse the registration.218
De Souza argues that this system is especially
punishing for women, who are unable to determine
whether their prospective husbands are already married to
another woman under customary law,219 while Higgins,
214
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216
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Fenrich, and Tanzer confirm this by noting that almost
every probate case dealt with by the Master of the High
Courts Office involved both a rural, customary wife and an
urban, civil wife whose marriage “would trump any
previous customary marriage.”220 Husbands in such
scenarios would have no motivation to register, since doing
so would require them to comply with the expensive and
time-consuming contractual necessities of s. 7(6) of the
RCMA, which, as we saw, require polygamous marriages
to have an antenuptial contract regarding their proprietary
system.221 His wives, however, would be at his mercy if a
dispute were to arise, and priority for any division of
property would essentially go to the first among them to
register their marriage.
Even in monogamous marriages, failure to register
can lead to dire consequences. De Souza points out that
“[e]mployers, pension funds and government departments
require people to produce a marriage certificate whenever
their marital status comes into question.”222 Although
spouses might be legally married according to their own
laws, and even according to the requirements of the RCMA,
lack of a certificate can lead to a complete denial of the
public and private rights that are supposed to be attendant
upon that marriage. For example, in Baadjies v Matubela223
the applicant sought a decree of divorce, maintenance, and
child support, but was denied when she was unable to
220
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produce a certificate, with the Court ruling that the couple
were never married. Similarly, in Road Accident Fund v
Mongalo224 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a
registration certificate was “conclusive proof” that a
marriage had occurred in order to claim survivor benefits
after an automobile accident.225 In short, De Souza is
correct when she states: “Statutory validity is thus
meaningless and in effect the marriage is unrecognised
without registration and a marriage certificate.”226
C. CRITIQUE
Whatever well-meaning intentions the drafters of the
RCMA may have had, De Souza is far from the only critic
to claim that the Act has essentially rendered Indigenouslaw marriages in South Africa meaningless by forcing strict
compliance with a statutory system. Maithufi and Bekker,
for example, boldly assert:
[T]he Act in effect abolishes customary
marriages. These marriages stand on three
legs: lobolo, polygamy, and the communal
nature of African family life. By imposing
the common law consequences of marriage
upon customary marriages, the entire fabric
of the communal ([and] extended) family
system is destroyed. One may ask why a
224
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couple should marry by customary law at all
if in the end the consequences are no different
from those of a common law marriage.227
Why indeed, since the South African system of
recognition—referred
to
by
this
author
as
“Codification”228—has made the living, evolving
customary laws of South Africa’s Indigenous peoples the
property of the state. Consequently, the state’s courts are
constitutionally required to invalidate229 or develop230
these laws whenever they conflict with European,
individualistic conceptions of human rights, often without
engaging in a meaningful analysis of how concepts like
“dignity” and “equality” are perceived and manifested in
group-centered Indigenous communities,231 and often
without “making a genuine attempt to understand and
honour the African philosophy behind the practice in
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question” to determine if these rights are already being
preserved by Indigenous mechanisms.232
Thus, the first fundamental problem with this
method of recognition that must be addressed is the issue
of the “code” itself. As Zlotkin warns, any codification of
customary laws encourages judges “to focus on the words
of the code rather than on evidence of the custom in
question, including evidence of its adaptability.”233 We
have seen this at play in South Africa’s jurisprudence
when, for example, the High Court held a marriage to be
invalid because of a failure to comply with the statutory
contractual requirements when entering into a polygamous
marriage,234 regardless of what the parties’ particular
Indigenous law may have required. As Lea Mwambene and
Helen Kruuse point out, “the failure of the parties to
comply with a ‘strict, black letter definitional analysis’ of
the relationship has resulted in a finding that a valid
marriage does not exist, and—as a result—no rights or
obligations exist.”235 Once a custom is codified, failure to
follow the code, even when it does not properly reflect the
custom, is a failure to follow the law.
This leads into the second fundamental problem
with the Codification method, namely that, once codified,
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customary law becomes the property of the state.236 On the
one hand, this takes the customary law out of the hands of
its Indigenous participants, depriving them of the ability to
modify and evolve the law to fit their changing,
modernizing needs, and stripping tribal elders of their
former roles as mediators and arbitrators. Instead, the law
becomes frozen at the point of codification, or possibly at
the point of judicial interpretation and precedent-setting,
causing that law to lose its ability to self-adapt to the
changing social needs of its adherents.237 On the other
hand, that same customary law then becomes subject to
development by those outside the Indigenous
community—that is, by the judiciary. As we saw, South
African courts are obligated to develop Indigenous laws to
fit the requirements of the CRSA, which can result in the
generation of new rules of consent or lobolo-payment that
are entirely foreign to the people group’s laws. In turn, this
creates a customary law that is not only robbed of its
distinctive features, but one which will inevitably become
increasingly indistinguishable from the common law until
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it is useless as an independent system, even to the people
whose law it originally was.238
Finally, by forcing compliance with a statutory
scheme, Codification places immense practical hardships
on those for whom customary law is the only law available,
namely those living in remote, disconnected, and poor
communities. Spouses entering a customary marriage are
often entirely unaware of the statutory consequences of
their union and only discover these when they are at their
most vulnerable: after the death of their spouse or during a
divorce. Maithufi claims that with the default community
of property regime, for example, “some people find
themselves, even before they commence to live together as
husband and wife…locked in a marriage whose
consequences they did not intend or contemplate.”239 The
quasi-mandatory registration system in particular has
resulted in otherwise valid marriages being discarded by
the state, or in wives of polygamous marriages being
deprived of their customary and statutory rights, simply
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because the registry is complicated, geographically distant,
and foreign to their culture.
The outcome of this codified quagmire is that
customary marriages are now, and will increasingly
become, identical to civil marriages. Nicola Barker argues
that the changes to customary marriage introduced by the
RCMA and its jurisprudence “align it with civil marriage to
the extent that all of the ‘elaborate consequences’ of civil
marriages have been made applicable to customary
marriages.”240 She claims that codification has essentially
abolished customary marriage in South Africa,241 a claim
with which De Souza agrees. “[I]nstead of elevating
customary law marriages to a status that is equal to that of
civil law marriages, in effect customary marriages are still
relegated to the shadows of non-recognition.”242
IV. A PROPOSAL – SIDE-BY-SIDE EXISTENCE
A. THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE
After examining the methods of Indigenous-law marriage
recognition in Canada and South Africa, it might be helpful
to remind ourselves of the fundamental issue, namely,
whether misrecognition even matters. If Indigenous-law
marriages are recognized as valid in one way or another,
what difference does it make if they are not recognized in
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the right way? Phrased in the most forthright way possible:
Who cares?
First, a practical answer. For most individuals who
practice Indigenous-law marriages, both in Canada and in
South Africa, there is simply no other option available to
them. The choice between a civil marriage and an
Indigenous-law marriage is not a real choice, but a
Hobson’s choice of adhering to Indigenous law or not
getting married at all. These peoples are often isolated from
the dominant culture, living in remote communities with
little or no access to the legal system of the state and its
officials, whether for the solemnization of their marriage
or for any other family law purposes. As Zlotkin puts it,
such people do not “make arbitrary choices between two
systems of law; they had practical or philosophical reasons
for this action. In many instances there was no choice to be
made; a person who wanted to marry…had to follow
customary law.”243
When spouses have no alternative but to marry one
another according to their custom—due to limitations of
isolation, finances, or unfamiliarity with the colonial legal
system, not to mention cultural and familial pressures—but
are then denied the validity of their marriage or forced to
overcome enormous evidentiary hurdles simply to
establish its existence, this is a fundamental injustice.
When this kind of political violence is committed against
sovereign peoples who have inhabited these countries and
have lived according to their own family laws since time
243
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immemorial, it is unacceptable in our allegedly modern and
enlightened century. “Far from being ‘merely’ symbolic,”
this form of misrecognition leads directly to
maldistribution of social resources that are otherwise
afforded to civil-married spouses, and to participatory
imparity in the rights and privileges that spouses in the
dominant culture take for granted.244
Second, it is vital to note that misrecognition is a
fundamental injustice whether accompanied by such
distributive and participatory inequality or not.245 Marriage
is “one of the most significant forms of personal
relationships,”246 so to position one culture’s form of
marriage as superior to another, by the ways in which each
is allowed to function in the legal system of a society, is to
posit that one type of marriage is more “significant” than
the other. Whatever form misrecognition takes, its essence
is an institutionalized perception that one form of marriage
is less worthy of respect than another. The misrecognition
of Indigenous-law marriages, in Canada especially,
suggests to the dominant society that they are not marriages
at all,247 but instead are “nothing more than the type of
common law relationship one frequently sees in the nonNative community.”248
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But marriages are not common law relationships.
They are fundamentally different. To be sure, the state is
able to grant the same kind of legal rights and protections
that spouses enjoy to couples living in non-marital
relationships. Likewise, in many Canadian provinces, the
parties to a non-marital “spousal relationship” are entitled
to the same proprietary and maintenance rights as a married
couple.249 Yet, the state is not able to grant a “spousal
relationship” the kind of spiritual, theological, or
cosmological significance that a particular culture places
within marriage. Marriage is not inherently a claim to a set
of public welfare benefits from the state, nor a claim to the
privilege of non-compellability in court, nor a claim to an
equal division of property upon divorce. The essential core
of marriage is a public declaration by the spouses to take
part in a culturally dictated set of obligations toward one
another, their families, and their communities, obligations
which may or may not—but usually do—have powerful
spiritual and ethical implications. When it comes to the
recognition of marriage, the state’s role is simply to allow
individuals to make these obligations without interfering,
and without favouring one set of obligations over
another.250
B. SIDE-BY-SIDE EXISTENCE
Indigenous-law marriages are not something to be avoided
or merely tolerated by the legal system. Canada must
acknowledge that it does not bear a monopoly on their
249
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recognition, and that the state alone does not have the
exclusive power to validate or invalidate, commence, or
terminate, certain types of interpersonal relationships.251
As Brendan Tobin states,
Customary law has been around a long time
and it is fair to say it is going to be around for
a long time to come. The sooner the legal
profession, legislators and the wider
populace come to terms with that fact and
embrace the rich legal diversity of
Indigenous peoples the sooner that diversity
can help enrich our national and international
legal systems.252
But the question remains how this might be done, and how
to avoid yet another form of misrecognition. Is it possible
to allow Indigenous-law marriages to flourish in a
genuinely validated capacity within the Canadian legal
world?
251
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At the outset, a necessary first step is for the state
to accept that it lacks a jurisdictional monopoly over this
limited area of law: Indigenous-law marriages can exist
side-by-side the independent functioning of civil
marriages. While this is an admittedly narrow scope for a
recognition of Indigenous legal systems, a comprehensive
proposal for the acknowledgment of Indigenous law in toto
is decidedly beyond the scope or purposes of this essay and
is better left to wiser scholars. Nevertheless, acceptance
must be done as a first step, and importantly must be done
in the correct way. Acknowledgment that takes the form of
a state sanction of Indigenous-law marriages retains the
falsehood that their validity exists at the mercy and whim
of the Crown. Further, acknowledgment by incorporation
into the state’s statutory system of laws is simply a
usurpation of power. Rather, proper acknowledgment
must, at the least, take the form proposed by Walters: the
state must recognize that an Indigenous community’s
validation of its own marriages is “one of many bodies of
law that can be shown to fit together in a manner that best
reflects the equal moral imperative for normative order.”253
An Indigenous nation’s law, which holds that their own
practices constitute a valid marriage, must be
acknowledged as having independent legal force without
the need to be endorsed by the state.
A second necessary step is that Canada must
acknowledge that Indigenous nations have the capacity to
form and empower internal institutions to govern the
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validation and dispute-resolution of their own marriages.254
In doing so, it is crucial to note—outside the terms of those
few self-governance agreements that have been entered
into between some nations, Canada, and the relevant
provincial or territorial government—that Indigenous
nations are not simply allowed to form these bodies, as this
would again merely perpetuate the view that this power is
being delegated by the Crown. While such a conferral of
authority is “to be expected when the state claims a
monopoly of legal authority,” as Morse and Woodman
phrase it, a belief that this authority is conferred by the state
would logically and practically lead to the conclusion that
it can be abridged, withdrawn, or terminated.255 Instead,
Canada must accept the independent juridical bodies of
Indigenous nations, formed and empowered by that
nation’s own laws rather than by any state legislative
enablement,256 and recognize their ability to structure,
solemnize, and validate their own marriages.
Of course, what form this juridical body takes will
necessarily depend upon the laws and matrimonial
practices of each specific nation. Moreover, this body may
not necessarily be the same institution as that which the
254
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community accords other juridical powers. Among the
Iroquois nations, for example, the clan mothers we
discussed previously may be empowered by the
community to govern the requirements for marital validity.
Others may choose tribal elders to fulfill this role, such as
the unnamed elder of the Blood Indian Reserve who told
Delia Manychief that cohabitation with parental consent
was sufficient for a marriage.257 Other communities may
simply leave it to the parents of the couple, or to the
extended family.
In most cases, but not necessarily all, this same
juridical body would also be the institution empowered by
the nation to engage in dispute resolution between the
couple. Since their marriage is inherently a set of
obligations toward one another dictated by the distinctive
culture of that community, it only makes sense that the
officials within that same community should have the
authority to determine if a breach of those obligations has
occurred, and what the culturally appropriate solution
should be. In many of these communities, law takes the
form of stories and processes rather than fixed rules;
disputes within marriages formed by these laws should be
solved by those who know the laws in their original form,
who understand the language of the stories in which they
are contained, who can “interpret their symbolism and
imagery,”258 and who can correctly apply them to the
appropriate circumstances. This would at least begin to
avoid the problem of conflating civil marriages and
Indigenous-law marriages when they are forced to use the
257
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same mechanisms to resolve disputes. An independent
forum of dispute resolution would allow for culturally
appropriate processes to interpret the solutions for
culturally dictated matrimonial obligations.
However, it is vital to be cognizant that centuries of
colonial practices have, in many communities and in many
ways, corrupted the traditional forms of Indigenous
juridical and governmental bodies away from their
traditional forms.259 This is yet another reason why
consultation with the communities is necessary when
empowering Indigenous self-governance institutions in
any sphere, not simply in marital solemnization and dispute
resolution. Ceding new or more powers to entities which,
in that cultural context, would have traditionally lacked
jurisdiction over family law matters—not to mention
entities that were originally established to carry out
assimilationist policies—would only facilitate maintaining
the status quo; or worse, facilitate further assimilation and
loss of the community’s distinctive marital beliefs and
practices.
Third, a procedure must be established for
regulating the interactions between the marital institutions
of Indigenous nations and the Canadian state. At least one
scholar has suggested that Indigenous laws and colonial
laws are “incommensurable,” in the sense that they inhabit
such distinct normative and ideological worlds that they
259
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cannot properly be compared, let alone function with one
another.260 This view suggests that Indigenous legal
systems and colonial legal systems cannot interact without
“exert[ing] violence in the lives of Indigenous peoples.”261
Even if true, this position is remarkably unhelpful for the
real world, outside the realm of ideas. Indeed, Tobin
suggests that “[t]he notion of legal pluralism as a
separation of legal worlds, in which Indigenous peoples’
rights to their legal regimes is limited to their own internal
affairs and has no bearing on third parties, is not in tune
with the needs and reality of today’s multicultural legal
melange.”262
In the world as it is, rather than the world as it
should be, interactions between even the narrow
jurisdiction of marital validation and the wider legal system
will be necessary and frequent. The question remains about
how to best to regulate this to avoid exerting social,
economic, cultural, or spiritual violence against Indigenous
peoples.263 Zlotkin suggests that once “a separate pre260
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existing system of [Indigenous] laws” has been
acknowledged, legislation by the state can recognize an
Indigenous legal system’s “applicability in the resolution
of disputes set outside aboriginal communities.”264 In an
earlier work, he pointed out that the “established judicial
system” will inevitably become “involved in appeals from
aboriginal legal systems,”265 making the depth and breadth
of any such legislation all the more important.
Necessarily, Indigenous nations would need to be
involved in the drafting of such legislation. Its scope would
also have to be narrowly focused on allowing for appeal in
circumstances where, as Tobin argues, certain universal
human rights have been breached,266 and on supporting the
expert opinions of the Indigenous juridical body discussed
above. For example, Brian Bix suggests that such
legislation could set specific boundaries, “namely
minimum terms that will ensure that vulnerable parties
(including third parties to marriage arrangements, in
particular children) are not badly harmed.”267 In a word,
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Side-By-Side Existence is not exclusive existence—nor
can it be in an increasingly multicultural, legally pluralized
world.
V. CONCLUSION
For at least eight thousand years, the marital laws and
structures of the Kwakwaka’wakw people have functioned.
This is not to say that such practices were without their
problems, or that they were static and unchanged for an
eon. Like marriage in all cultures, these customs no doubt
adapted to fit the evolving needs of the people, to meet new
circumstances, to correct old mistakes, and to create better
futures for their children. But for generations, these laws
operated and flourished, developing and incorporating an
intricate cosmology that placed the family at its core, while
forming a fundamental element that has been key to the
survival of a people and a culture since time immemorial.
Indigenous people do not need their marriages to be
validated by the state for them to work. They know they
work. They do not need the state to recognize that their
marriages have value. They know they have value. Yet the
misrecognition of marriage—the failure of the state or the
broader population to perceive and empower marriage in
the form that a particular culture has moulded it over
thousands of years—does devalue marriage and does work
genuine harm. Indigenous-law marriages will continue to
worldviews such that the desired end is not actually achieved for that
community. In creating and enforcing such rights-protecting minimum
terms, one must strive to understand the Indigenous philosophy behind
a specific practice, and perceive how multiple normative orders may
achieve the same outcome through different—and even ostensibly
conflicting—methods.
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occur and to serve the social and spiritual needs of their
spouses. Canada’s role is simply to recognize these in the
way that will best achieve justice for their participants.

